Dynamical Methods Applied in Natural Resource Economics by HALKOS, George E. & PAPAGEORGIOU, George J.
Journal of 
Economics and Political Economy 
www.kspjournals.org 
Volume 3                              March 2016                                Issue 1 
 
Dynamical Methods Applied in Natural Resource 
Economics 
 
By George E. HALKOS
aa†
  
& George J. PAPAGEORGIOU
ab
 
 
Abstract. This paper presents, in brief, the fundamentals of optimal control theory together 
with some notes for differential games, which is the game theoretic analogue of the optimal 
control. As it is recommended by literature references the main tool of analysis in open 
loop information structure for environmental models is the Pontryagin’s Maximum 
Principle, while the Hamilton–Jacobi–Bellman equation is the tool of analysis for any 
closed loop informational structure. As applications of the above theoretic considerations 
we present some environmental economic models which are solved both as optimal control 
problems and as differential games as well. 
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1. Introduction 
ptimal control is one of many strands of control theory which uses 
mathematical methods to address a wide area of applications in many 
scientific fields. The mathematics of optimal control theory is the 
generalization of the ancient theory called "calculus of variations". The early 
applications in calculus of variations were in physics, since 1662 Fermat derived 
“the law of refraction” as a solution to a minimum time problem. Only after more 
than 250 years, in 1924, Evans studied a dynamic economic model for 
monopolists, whereas Ramsey (1928), using techniques of calculus of variations, 
solved the famous capital accumulation model (the well known Ramsey model). 
The first environmental model analyzed with the calculus of variations was the 
optimal exploitation of exhaustible resources, first proposed by Hotelling (1931). 
To begin with optimal control theory it is better to set the statement of a calculus of 
variations problem and then to compare with the same optimal control problem 
statement and solution. 
The fundamental calculus of variations problem appears as an optimization 
problem of the form:  
 
aa† Department of Economics, Laboratory of Operations Research, University of Thessaly, Korai 43, 
Volos 38333, Greece. 
. + 0030 24210 74920 
. halkos@econ.uth.gr 
 b Department of Economics, University of Thessaly, Volos, Greece. 
 . + 0030 24210 74920 
. gjpap@otenet.gr 
O 
Journal of Economics and Political Economy 
 JEPE, 3(1), G.E. Halkos, & G.J. Papageorgiou, p.12-31. 
13 
13 
Max or min     






T
dt
tdx
txtFxV
0
)(
)(,  
subject to Ax )0( (A given)     (1) 
and   ZTx )( (T, Z given) 
                       
 
The task of the calculus of variations is to select from a set of admissible x  
paths the one that yields an extreme value of the integral  V[x] . Note that the 
solution path is restricted to those curves that are continuous with continuous 
derivatives. 
For the solution process of problem (1) one has to deal with the basic first order 
condition, also called the Euler equation, which briefly says that every small 
perturbation e*p(t) of the optimal time path x*(t), i.e. x(t)=x* t +e*p(t), has no 
action on the integral V[x], as this perturbation tends to zero, or formally  
 
0
0

ee
d
dV
        (2) 
 
so the condition 𝑑𝑉/𝑑𝑒 = 0 is a necessary condition for the extremal.  
Since (2) is not operating, as many arbitrary variables are involved, the final 
form of the Euler equation, after the appropriate development, becomes: 
 
0'  xx Fdt
d
F  for all  Tt ,0     (3) 
 
and the more explicit version of the Euler equation, after (3)’s expansion, is the 
following second order nonlinear differential equation 
 
𝐹𝑥 ′ 𝑥 ′ 𝑥
′′  𝑡 + 𝐹𝑥 ′ 𝑥 ′ 𝑥
′ 𝑡 + 𝐹𝑡𝑥 ′ − 𝐹𝑥 = 0  for all  𝑡 ∈  0, 𝑇      (4)      
   
That is (4) is a more familiar, since the only calculations needed are the 
derivatives of the objective functional F with respect to 𝑥′𝑥′ , 𝑥′ ,  𝑡𝑥′  and x. 
Suppose you need to find the extremal of the functional 𝑉 𝑥 =  (12𝑡𝑥 +
2
0
𝑥′
2
)𝑑𝑡 with boundary conditions 𝑥 0 = 0 and 𝑥 2 = 8. Since 𝐹 = 12𝑡𝑥 + 𝑥′
2
, 
following (4) we compute  𝐹𝑥 = 12𝑡, 𝐹𝑥 ′ = 2𝑥
′ , 𝐹𝑥 ′′ = 2 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐹𝑥𝑥 ′ = 𝐹𝑡𝑥 ′ = 0. 
The Euler equation and its solution is the following: 
2x'' t -12t=0 ↔ x'' t =6t ↔ x' t =3t2+c1 ↔ x
* t =t3+c1t+c2 
The values of the constants of integration are 𝑐2 = 𝑐1 = 0 , setting in the 
solution 𝑡 = 0 and 𝑡 = 2  and substituting into the boundary conditions. So the 
extremal, the optimal time path, is the cubic time function 𝑥𝑡 𝑡 = 𝑡3. 
A special class of the isoperimetric problems arising in the case the constraint is 
substituted by an integral of the type:  𝐺 𝑡, 𝑥, 𝑥′ 𝑑𝑡 = 𝑘
𝑡
0
 with k a constant. In 
such a situation the problem appears in general (with m integral constraints) as 
 
maximize dtxxxxxxtF
T
nn ),....,,,....,,(
0
''
2
'
121  
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and appropriate boundary conditions 
 
In this case the Euler equation becomes the following Euler–Lagrange equation 
(it is assumed only one integral constraint) 
 
0)()( ''  xxxx GFdt
d
GF       (5) 
 
where  is the Lagrange multiplier which in the isoperimetric case is a constant.  
Moreover, in the one–state–variable problem with a single integral constraint, it 
can be shown that the modified Lagrange integrand ),,(),,( '' xxtGxxtFL 
can be used and then apply the Euler – Lagrange equation to x  alone. Now the 
value of the (constant)  can be determined from the isoperimetric constraint. 
In the above class of the isoperimetric problems belongs the model proposed by 
H. Hotelling in the classic article “The Economics of Exhaustible Resources” 
(Hotelling, 1931). The major conclusion of the Hotelling model is that the pure 
competition can yield a socially optimal extraction path for an exhaustible 
resource, while the monopoly cannot. The resulting condition, after the solution
1
 of 
the isoperimetric problem, which ensures the above conclusion, is the following 
 
pteQCQP  )()( '       (6) 
 
which in turn says that, in the pure competition, the quantity )()( ' QCQP   grows 
at the interest rate r . Note that the Lagrange multiplier   in (6) represents the 
initial value of the difference price minus marginal cost ))()(( ' QCQP  .  
In the monopoly the final solution leads to the conclusion “the difference 
between the marginal revenue and the marginal cost grows at the interest rate”, i.e.
pteQCQR  )()( '' , which is suboptimal compared with the socially optimal 
extraction. After the Pontryagin's et al. (1962) book "Mathematical Theory of 
Optimal Processes", the Maximum Principle became the main tool of analysis in 
economics and management, physics, biology and so on. The absolute success of 
the Maximum Principle is due to the introduction of the two, instead of one, types 
of variables in the optimization process. The first is the control and the other is the 
state variable. The control variable is a steering mechanism which one can 
maneuver so that as to drive the state variable to various positions at any time via 
one or more equations of motion. That is, the Maximum Principle is this tool which 
sets an order in the mess of the corner solutions that may appear in the optimization 
process. Here the goal of the optimal control theory, is the determination of the 
 
1 For a detailed analysis of the solution process, see among others Chiang (1982). 
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optimal time path of the control variable first and then the determination of the 
state variable, unlike the calculus of variations where the main task is to find the 
optimal time path of the state variable. 
Especially the simplest optimal control problem can be derived from the 
calculus of variations problem if the time derivative of the state variable, involved 
in the objective functional, is replaced by the so called equation of motion. Below 
we present a simple calculus problem together with the equivalent optimal control 
problem. The calculus problem is:  
 
Max or min   
T
dtxxtFV
0
),,   
subject to Ax )0( (A given)                  (7a) 
and   freeTx )( (T given) 
                       
 
                                           
 
Now introducing the control variable u  and the equation of motion ux   the 
same problem in optimal control fashion can be written as:  
 
 
Max or min   
T
dtuxtFV
0
),,  
subject to ux  (A given)                                    (7b) 
and   freeTxAx )(,)0(  (A,T given) 
                       
 
and the fundamental link between the two variables became apparent. 
It is important to say that at the solution process, according to the Maximum 
Principle, except the time, state and control variables one more class of variable(s) 
will emerge. This is the so called costate variable, measuring the shadow price of 
the state variable, denoted by λ(t). 
Except the maximum principle there is another solution method for optimal 
control problems which is called the "dynamic programming". Starting with a 
wider class of similar problems which can be solved, the original problem is 
embodied in the larger class of problems. A policy oriented expression for the 
principle of optimality could be the following: “An optimal policy has the property 
that whatever the initial state and initial decision are, the remaining decisions must 
constitute an optimal policy with regard to the state resulting from the first 
decision”. Now, it remains to set as simple as possible in rigorous mathematics the 
maximum principle and principle of optimality.  
 
2. The formulation of the problem and the solution process 
We discuss the class of optimal control problems that appears in the modeling 
of dynamic systems. Then, the state of a system at time t  can be described by the 
following n–dimensional column vector 
 
 TtRtxtxtxtx n ,0,))(),....(),(()(
'''
21   
 
where the terminal time 0T  in many economic applications is infinity, i.e. 
T . Moreover suppose that there is a decision maker influencing the time path 
of the state variable by choosing the time path of the m–dimensional control value. 
That is  
Journal of Economics and Political Economy 
 JEPE, 3(1), G.E. Halkos, & G.J. Papageorgiou, p.12-31. 
16 
16 
 
 Ttttxtutututu m ,0),),(())(),....(),(()(
'
21   
 
The control variable )(tu  is a piecewise continuous function and )),(( ttx is 
the given control region, i.e. )),(()( ttxtu  . Additionally it is assumed that the 
dynamis of the state variable is governed by the following Ordinary Differential 
Equation (ODE) 
 
)),(),(()( ttutxftx       Tt ,0                (8a) 
subject to 0)0( xx                             (8b) 
 
with terminal constraints: 
,)( Tii xTx    
'....,1 ni                 (8c) 
,)( Tii xTx    
''' ....,1 nni                (8d) 
,)( freeTxi   nni ....,1
''                          (8e) 
                    
where 
nmn RRRRfnnnnn  :,,0,0 ''''''  is a vector valued 
function, 
'
21 ),....,,( nffff  where for all ni ,....,1  ),,( tuxf i and 
xtuxfi  /),,(  are continuous functions with respect to their arguments. Equation 
(8a) is the system dynamics or the equation of motion. 
Now we suppose that the decision maker has a time discounted objective in the 
form of the following functional 
 
)),(()),(),(((.))(
0
TTxSedtttutxgeuV T
T
t        (9) 
)),(),(( ttutxg is the instantaneous profit gained by exerting the control 
variable )(tu  at time, t , )(tx  is the current state, while  is the positive discount 
rate. At the end horizon T the state would be )(Tx  , while the corresponding 
payoff  is described by the term  )),(( TTxS  also called, in the optimal control 
language, the salvage or scrap value. The payoff function )),(),(( ttutxg  and its 
partial derivative xuxg  /),,(  are assumed continuous with respect to their 
arguments as well as the scrap value function RRRS n :  with respect to x  
and T. Then the task of the regulator is to choose the best policy (.)u among all the 
admissible trajectories. As a consequence the optimal control problem is the 
maximization of the reward (.))(uV  taking into account that the state’s motion is 
governed by equation (8a). 
As it is mentioned above, generally there exists two different approaches to 
solve an optimal control problem of the type (8)-(9). One is based on the 
Pontryagin’s Maximum Principle (Pontryagin et al., 1962; Grass et al., 2008), 
while the other hinges upon the Hamilton–Jacobi–Bellman (HJB) equation 
introduced by Bellman (1957). 
2.1. The Maximum Principle 
Before we proceed with the necessary first order conditions of the maximization 
with the Maximum Principle approach, it is important to introduce the Hamiltonian 
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function (H), which has as arguments all the involved variables ,,, uxt . The 
Hamiltonian function is defined as 
 
),,()(),,(),,,( uxtftuxtguxtH                           (10) 
 
Once the Hamiltonian function is defined by (10) there is the requirement to 
maximized with respect to the control variable u  at every point of time. 
Pontryagin’s Maximum Principle states as:  
Theorem 1 (Pontryagin et al., 1962; Grass et al, 2008).  
Let  (.)(.), ** ux  be an optimal solution of the problem (8)-(9)
 
with free terminal 
state. Then there exists a continuous and piecewise continuously differentiable 
function (.)  with  '')( Rt   satisfying for all  Tt ,0   
 
)),(),(),((max)),(),(),(( *
)),((
**
*
tttutxHtttutxH
ttxu


  
         
and at every point of time t  where (.)u  is continuous  
 
)),(),(),(()()( ** tttutxHtt x  
             (10a) 
 
Furthermore the transversality condition  
 
)),(()( * TTxST x                         (10b) 
 
holds, where the Hamiltonian function is defined as (10).  
Next in the lines of Forster (1980) we provide an example of a pollution 
abatement model solved as an optimal control problem. 
Example 1 
A question raised in Environmental Economics is how much of a given level of 
emissions should be abated (with a given abatement technology) and how much 
should be diffused in the environment. To focus on this problem let us assume that 
)(tP  represents the pollutants flows generated by the firms’ production process 
and )(PE  are the emissions produced by these pollutants flows. These emissions 
can either be abated or diffused in the environment. Let A be the amount of 
emissions allocated for abatement, so APED  )(  is the corresponding 
diffusion rate or net emissions dispersed in the environment. The stock of 
pollutants is raised according to the equation  
 
PAPEPDP   )(  0)0( PP   
 
where   is natural decay rate. 
Furthermore let )(AU  be the utility which the society enjoys from the 
abatement at rate A  and   is the discount factor of the society. Then the regulator 
has to solve the following optimal control problem 
 
   
T
Tt
A
TPSedtAUe
0(.)
))(()(max                       (11a) 
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PAPEP  )(                         (11b) 
0)0( PP                  (11c) 
 
where S  is the salvage function mentioned above. 
The necessary assumptions on the functions U and E are the following: 
 
0)('',)0(',0)('  AUUAU  for all  0A                        (12a) 
0)('',0)('  PEPE   for all  0P                    (12b) 
  )(',)0(',0)0( EEE                       (12c) 
0)('' PS                          (12d)  
 
The properties summarized in (12) are the well known Inada conditions. For the 
solution of the optimal control problem (11), first we formulate the Hamiltonian 
function 
 
))(()( APPEAUH                  (13) 
 
The Hamiltonian function is concave with respect to A  due to the assumptions 
(12), i.e. for all  0'' UH AA . Thus the maximizer 
*A of the Hamiltonian 
),,( APH  for fixed P  and  lies in the interior of ],0[   and satisfies the 
following first order condition 
 
0)('),,( **   AUAPH A  
                                 
from which the Maximum Principle yields 
 
)(' *AU                   (14) 
 
Due to the concavity of the utility function U , the inverse function 1)'( U  
exists and therefore 
*A  is a function of the adjoint variable   given by 
 
)()'()( 1*   UA                            (15) 
 
The Hamiltonian's concavity in ),( AP is assured. This is easily seen, by using 
the positivity of  , which can be deduced from (14) and (12a), which in turn 
implies the negative definiteness of the matrix 
 












''0
0)(''
U
PE
HH
HH
AAAP
PAPP 
 
                                  
and therefore the concavity of the Hamiltonian. Moreover the hypothesis that 
any solution that satisfies the necessary conditions is optimal is ensured (applying 
the maximum principle), due to the concavity of the salvage function. 
Next we derive the equation of motion for the costate variable by applying 
(10b). For the Hamiltonian (13), (10b) yields 
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 ))('())('( PEPEHP 
                 (16) 
 
Substituting (15) into the state equation (11b) establishes  
 
PUPEP    )()'()( 1                             (17) 
 
Equations (16) an (17) is the so called canonical system of equations which is 
appropriate for further analysis. 
Since the control function given by (15) is differentiable with respect to time, 
the time derivative of the 0),,( APH A is: 
 
  AAUH
dt
d
A )(''  
 
and using the adjoint equation (16) and equation (14), the time derivative of the 
control A can be written as: 
 
)(''
)('
)(
)(''
)('
AU
PE
AU
AU
A                (17a) 
 
Equation (17a) together with the state dynamics PAPEP  )(  constitute 
the transformed state–control system. 
The infinite horizon version of the Maximum Principle was first introduced by 
Halkin (1974) as: 
Theorem 2 (Maximum Principle for an Infinite Time Horizon) 
Let the pair (.))(.),( ** ux  be an optimal solution of the infinite horizon problem 
analogue to (8)-(9) problem. Then there exists a continuous and piecewise 
continuously differentiable function (.)  with  '')( Rt   and a constant 00 
satisfying for all  Tt ,0   
 
0))(( 0 t  
)),(),(),((max)),(),(),(( *
)),((
**
*
tttutxHtttutxH
ttxu


  
 
and at every point of time t where (.)u  is continuous  
 
),),(),(),(()()( 0
** tttutxHtt x  
  
                       
        
 
Note that there is no transversality condition in the sense of (10b), a result that 
is a consequence of the proof strategy presented in Halkin (1974). 
Continuing with the pollution abatement model in infinite horizon, the basic 
equations are transformed below as                             









0
(.)
)(max dtAUe t
A

                (18a) 
PAPEP  )(                (18b) 
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0)0( PP                  (18c) 
)(0 PEA                (18d) 
'PP                  (18e) 
            
 
and the canonical system 
               
PAPEP  )(                (19a) 
))('(
)(''
)('
PE
AU
AU
A                 (19b) 
 
Next we draw the phase portrait for the canonical system of equations (19a)-
(19b). Therefore we consider the AP  , , isoclines, yielding 
 
PPEA  )(                (20a) 
 )(' PE                (20b) 
 
Under the assumptions (12b), (12c), the P  isocline (20a) reduces to a strictly 
concave function. This concave function vanishes at the origin and for some 0
~
P
, but meets its maximum at some PPm
~
0  . The other isocline A  becomes a 
vertical line. The condition (12c) together with (20b) now assures the existence of a 
unique P  satisfying (20b). Finally we find a unique equilibrium at AP
~
,
~
 with 
PPEA
~
)
~
(
~
  for which the corresponding Jacobian is the following matrix: 
 














0
1
)
~
(''
)
~
(''
)
~
('
)
~
('
)
~
,
~
(ˆ
PE
AU
AU
PE
APJ

 
 
Since 0ˆdet J  there exists a saddle point equilibrium, i.e., the equilibrium 
exhibits a stable path. Therefore, for initial values in a neighborhood of P  the 
stable path is a possible candidate for an optimal solution.  
Further phase portrait analysis includes the following two cases. 
Case 1: Under the constraint (18d) there exist points 21
~~
PP  , with the property: 
for initial values between these points the resulting path is the unique optimal 
solution (see Figure 1). The exit point 1
~
P  is an intersection point of the state path 
with the axis A= 0 , but the  point  2
~
P lies into the intersection of the stable path 
with the curve )EPA  . 
Case 2: With the constraint (18e) the solution for  1
~
'
~
PPP   is depicted in 
Figure 1.b. In this case it is optimal to control the system into the marginal 
equilibrium point ',' AP . For initial values of the state into the open interval 
between  'P  and 1
~
P  the optimality of the above solution can be explicitly shown. 
Since  0)( t  for all  t  and PtPt
~
)(lim 

,  the limiting transversality condition 
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is satisfied for any admissible orbit of the state. Finally, we conclude that the 
depicted solution in Figure 1.b is the unique optimal solution, because the adjoint 
and the control variables are both continuous at the point  1
~
P . 
Note that Figures 1.a and 1.b are drawn for the functional forms PPE )(    
and   AAU log)(   and the parameter values are δ=0.5 and ρ=0.1.    
 
        A  
                       0A  
                                                   )(PEA   
 
 
 
 
 
       A
~
                                 0P     
 
        0   1
~
P   P
~
          2
~
P                                                             P  
 
Figure 1.a. The black dotted curve is the optimal solution path for the pollution 
abatement model. Starting between the states 1
~
P  and 2
~
P  the path which converges 
to the saddle point PA
~
,
~
is the optimal solution. For all other initial values except 
the previously noted the control trajectory under consideration is on its boundary 
until the exit point 1
~
P  or 2
~
P  is met. 
    
      A  
 
                                                        )(PEA   
 
 
 
 
 
     'A                                                  0P  
 
 
        0                'P    1
~
P                                                              P       
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Figure 1.b. Here we consider  'PP  , i.e., for state values into the interval  
between 'P and 2
~
P , the optimal control line lies in the interior of the control region 
and the optimal path leads to the boundary equilibrium ',' PA . For states 1
~
PP   
the control values are chosen from the upper boundary of the control region, until 
the exit point  1
~
P  is reached.  
2.2. The Principle of Optimality 
As it is mentioned above the other approach to solve optimal control problems 
is the principle of Optimality and is based on the HJB equation. According to that 
principle, the wider class of these problems, in which an optimal control problem 
belongs, is sated as follows: 
 
)),(()),(),((max
(.)
TTxSdsssuxxg
T
t
u
             (21a) 
)),(),(()( ssusxfsx     Tts ,            (21b) 
)(tx  
 
As it is assumed above the optimal control problem under consideration has an 
optimal solution for any pair ),( t  . The Bellman equation with the pair
),(),,( tVt  , as arguments, is defined as 
 
 
T
t
u
TTxSdsssusxgtV )),(()),(),((max),(
(.)
              (22) 
 
Now in order to produce the HJB equation the following Principle of Optimality 
must be used. 
Theorem 3 (Principle of Optimality)  
We suppose that there exists a solution (.))(.),( ** ux of the problem (21) and this 
solution exists for each pair ),( t  with ''],,0[ RTt   . Then  (.))(.),( ** ux  is 
an optimal solution for the problem of class (21) with )(tx  if and only if 
 
 
s
t
ssxVduxgtV )),(()),(),((),( ***             (23a) 
)),(()),(( ** TxSTTxV                (23b) 
 
Note that, the information which records the relative change of  ),( tW   with 
respect to     when s  tends to  t  is given by relation (23a). The resulting HJB 
equation formally is defined as follows. 
Theorem 4 (HJB equation).  
Let there exist an admissible control (.)*u and their corresponding trajectory 
(.)*x
 
for the state. Moreover the Bellman function ),( tV   is continuously 
differentiable with respect to x and t . Then (.))(.),( ** ux  is an optimal solution of 
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the problem (21) if and only if the Bellman function ),( tV   satisfies the HJB 
equation: 
 
 ),,(),(),,(max),( tuftVtugtV x
u
t              (24a) 
),(),( TSTV                  (24b) 
 
for all    TRt ,0''),(    for which (.)*u  is continuous.                              
Note that for the problems which the discount factor is entered into the 
objective functional, equation (24a) is not operative in the solution process. 
Therefore another condition, for the HJB equation provided by Dockner et al 
(2000), satisfies the following partial differential equation: 
 
 ),,(),(),,(max),(),( tuxftxVtuxgtxVtxV u
u
t               (25) 
 
and (25) is the HJB function for discounted problems, which is very useful for our 
economic problems under consideration. 
Next we present an example of a very simple environmental model for which 
the HJB equation is used in order to extract feedback strategies and the optimal 
value function. 
Example 2 
Assume we have a nonrenewable resource extraction monopolistic firm that 
sells the extracted product at a fixed price 0p . We denote by  u t  the 
resource’s extraction rate and we suppose that this rate equals to the sales rate, thus 
preventing the resource’s stock up. Moreover we denote by  x t  the remainder 
resource stock at time t . The system dynamics is described as “the rate of 
reduction of the resource stock equals to the extraction rate”. Thus the equation of 
motion is the following: 
 
)()(( tutx                   (26) 
 
and with boundary conditions 0)(,0)(  tutx   
Extraction cost is an increasing function with respect to the extraction rate  u t  
and decreasing with respect to the remainder stock  x t . 
The monopolistic firm maximizes its discounted profits, given by the objective 
functional: 
 
 


0
))(),(()((.))( dttxtuctpueuJ t                (27) 
And the optimal control problem is: 
 


 
0
))](),(()([(.))(max dttxtuctpueuJ t               (28) 
Subject to     )()( tutx    
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With the boundary conditions       0,    0 x t u t  
Specifying the cost function as: 
 
x
u
xuc
2
),(
2
       (29) 
 
we have the following result. 
Proposition 1  
“An optimal feedback extraction strategy  u x, t  of the problem (28) under the 
constraint (26) is the following: 
 

)]([
)),((
tApx
ttxu

  
where )(tA  is the unique solution of the following Riccati differential equation: 
 
2
2
''
2
)]([
)()(


tAp
tAtA

  
 
Proof 
The HJB equation of the above problem is: 
 
 ),,(),(),,(max),(),( tuxftxVtuxgtxVtxV x
u
t   
with  )(),,(,2
)(),,(
2
tutuxf
x
u
tputuxg 

 
 
Taking the first order conditions of the above HJB function we have: 
 
 












0
),(
2
0
),,(),(),,(
2
u
utxV
x
u
pu
u
tuxftxVtuxg
x
x

 
 

 )),((
),(0),(
txVpx
txutxV
x
u
p xx

               (30) 
 
Making use of the well informed guess for the value function 
 
xtAtxV )(),(   
 
thus giving the following derivatives: 
 
)(),( tAtxVx   
xtAtxVt )(),(
  
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Now substituting the value function derivative (with respect to state) into the 
strategy (30) we have the final strategy 
 

)]([
)),((
tApx
ttxu

  
 
Now it remains to verify that this strategy satisfies the initial HJB equation for 
the conjectured linear value function  xtAtxV )(),(  . 
First, substituting the strategy into the right hand side of the HJB equation 
gives: 
 
 





 







 





))((
)(
2
))((
)((
)(
2
22
tApx
tA
x
tApx
tApx
pHJBRHS
2
))(( 2tAp
x

  
 
Second, the left hand side of the same equation becomes: 
 
)]()([),(),()( tAtAxtxVtxrVHJBLHS t
   
 
Equating both sides, i.e.
 
)()( HJBRHSHJBLHS   the result is the differential 
equation 
 


2
)]([
)()(
2tAp
tAtA

  
for which the solution must be )(tA  in order to satisfy the HJB equation.         
 
3. Differential Games 
Game theory is intended to be a useful tool for modeling situations in which 
there are many (rational) decision makers and for guessing the outcome of decision 
makers' competition or cooperation. Here we deal only with differential games. 
Differential games involved in dynamic conflict situations, for which an arbitrary 
number of decision makers (such as renewable or nonrenewable resources 
extractors, pollution regulators etc) interact in an environment e.g., a fishery place, 
a mine, a factory or a society). 
In fact, differential games are those dynamic games for which the maximization 
of each player's objective is subject to some limitations. All those constraints which 
are subject to the payoffs of each player are included in one or more differential 
equations describing the state's evolution of the game. 
Since every player involved in a differential game has its own objective 
functional to maximize (or minimize), optimal control theoretic methods can be 
used. Considering the game’s solution, we seek for the Nash equilibrium which is 
the appropriate, but not the only, concept of solution. Under the Nash equilibrium 
concept there no incentive for none of the involved players to deviate from his/her 
own Nash equilibrium strategy. 
Before we continue with the (brief) description of the solution it is necessary to 
give some definitions of the type of the available strategies depending on 
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information patterns. An open loop strategy is only a time dependent rule of 
decision, i.e., the resulting controls are functions of time as: 
 
)()( ttu ii   
 
An open loop strategy is used only if the players commit at the start of the game to 
follow a fixed time path. This strategy is applied only if it is impossible for every 
one player to observe the current state variable involved. 
A closed loop of feedback or Markovian strategy is that for which each player 
observes the system’s current state i.e., according to the state – time pair ),( tx  and 
decides about her action according to the rule: 
 
)),(()( ttxtu ii   
 
while the stationary closed loop strategy is defined independently of the time as: 
 
))(()( txtu ii   
 
The major question raised in differential games is how we can compute the Nash 
equilibrium. Supposing that all the other N–1 rivals of player i  use closed loop 
strategies  ijttxtu ij  ),),(()(   , then player  i  has to solve an optimal control 
type problem, which is of the following form: 
 




T
i
T
iii
t
u
TxSedtttxuxge ii
ii
0
(.)
))(()),,(,,(max
   
),),,(,,( ttxuxfx ii    0)0( xx   
 
where )),(),....,(),,(),....,,(),,((),( 1121 txtxtxtxtxtx Niii     
 
Since one differential game is faced as N optimal control games the above 
theorems 2 and 4 for the Maximum Principle and for the Principle of Optimality 
are in use.  
Next we present an example of a differential game model. 
Example 3 
As a differential game example we deal with the basic renewable resource 
model, but we modify its growth function to be a Gompertz type. The Gompertz 
growth function is given by the expression (see for instance Schafer, 1967) 
 
))](ln(1)[()( txtxxg   
 
Concerning the properties of the Gompertz growth this function first of all 
fulfills the conditions:  
 
)ln()(' xxg   0
1
)('' 
x
xg  0)0( g  
 
Second, it is a concave function and therefore it has "the pure compensation 
property" as it is defined by Clark (1984). 
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Third, it is right–skewed and has the same properties as the logistic growth 
function, while the upper stationary solution of )(xgx  , i.e. the solution ex  , 
is asymptotically stable. 
 
    )(xg  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
             
              0                      1                                              e                         x  
Figure 2: The shape of the Gompertz growth function ))](ln(1)[()( txtxxg   
 
According to that growth function the stock of the resource obeys to the 
following differential equation law of motion: 
 
21]9)(ln(1)[()(   txtxtx  
 
where 2,1,1 i  is the harvesting function for the two players of the model. If we 
define the fishing effort for the i  player as )(/)()( txtta ii  , then the game is a 
non-cooperative one for which every agent chooses a time path of his own fishing 
effort )(tai  that maximizes the discounted utility. We transform the utility in the 
form of an additive separable function, i.e. dependent on the fish stock )(tx  and on 
utility that every player enjoys from harvesting )(1 t  as well.  
We specify the utility functions to be in logarithmic form arising from the 
following utility function specification often used in growth models 
 








0)ln(
)1,0(
1
)(




x
x
xU  
 
for which the elasticity of intertemporal substitution is given by )1/(1  . 
Moreover, we define )(ln)( txty   in the case 0 .  
A number of calculations are performed in order to set up the problem. The 
calculations are the following:  
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)()()()()(
)(
)()(ln)( )()( tytxtxtyetx
dt
tdx
etxtxty tyty  
 
Now, the transformed evolution equation becomes: 
 

)()(
))(ln(1
)(
)(
))](ln(1)[()( 2121
txtx
tx
tx
tx
txtxtx




)()()(1)( 21 tatatyty    
 
This is the transformed stock evolution equation that depends on the logarithm 
of the resource stock as well as on the players’ fishing effort. 
The utility function that is maximized is depending on the resource stock and on 
effort as well. It is assumed that original present value maximized utility is 
dependent on the harvesting function, i.e.: 


0
))(ln(max dtte i
t  , but the latter 
can be transformed as follows: 
  
   
 
 
0 0
))](ln())(ln())([ln(max))(ln(max dttxtxtedtte i
t
i
t
ii
 



 
 
 
 
 












0 0
)]())([ln(max))(ln(
)(
)(
lnmax dttytaedttx
tx
t
e i
t
a
it
ii



 
   
The differential game now becomes:  
 


 
0
)]()([ln(max dttytae i
t
ai
     (31) 
Subject to  
ia
tatatyty )()()(1)( 21      (32) 
 
In what follows we explore the Nash equilibria of the game which may be a 
time consistent one in the sense of subgame perfectness.  
Time consistency could be seen as a minimal requirement for the credibility of 
an equilibrium strategy. If player i (i=1,2) had an incentive to deviate from his 
strategy iy  during the time interval ),0[ T , the other player 2,1, Jj  would not 
believe his announcement of  i  in the first place. Consequently, player j  
computes his own strategy taking into account the expected future deviation of 
player i  which, in general, would lead to strategies different from ijj , . Open-
loop informational structure strategies are not in general time consistent; while 
closed-loop or Markovian strategies are certainly time consistent (Dockner et al., 
2000).  
On the other hand subgame perfectness is the concept for which an equilibrium 
strategy remains unchanged regardless the starting period the game begins. So, 
subgame perfectness is a sole requirement for the credibility of an equilibrium 
strategy that is time consistency for that strategy. We conclude if we can found an 
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equilibrium strategy for the game, independently of the initial state and regardless 
of the informational structure employed, this strategy has the subgame perfectness 
property and can be a time consistent strategy. 
Equilibrium analysis 
Proposition 2 
The game with the Gompertz as the resource growth function, admits an 
equilibrium strategy of the form 1 ia  , which is time consistent. 
Proof 
The Hamiltonian of the above problem for the player i (i=1,2) is 
)]()()(1)[()(ln)( 21 tatatyttatyH ii    
  
and the conditions for an interior solution are 
)(
1
)(0)(
)(
1
t
tat
taa
H
i
ii
i

 


 
The costate’s variable equation of motion becomes:  
)()1(1)()()( ttt
y
H
t i  


   
With solution 

 
t
et )1(
1
1
)( 

  
along with the transversality condition 0)()(lim 

tyt
t
 ,  
which must be satisfied, so it is reasonable to set 0  and the costate variable 
becomes 
1
1
)(



 t . Substituting the value of the costate variable into the 
strategy, the resulting strategy becomes 1a r= +i  which is independent of the 
initial state, and therefore it is time consistent. 
Proposition 3 
In the case the players cooperate the joint cooperative time consistent 
equilibrium harvesting strategy is given by the expression
2
1
)(



ta . 
Proof 
The evolution equation in the cooperative case becomes 
)(2)(1)( tatyty  where )()()( 21 tatata  is the joint fishing effort of 
the two players. The Hamiltonian for the cooperative case is,  
 
)](2)(1)[()(ln)(0 tatyttatyH    
 
and the rest of algebraic manipulations for maximization reveals the cooperative 
equilibrium strategy 
1
2
a
r +
=  which is again time consistent.  
The payoff (Value) function 
Proposition 4 
In the case the players do not cooperate the payoff function for each player is 










 2
1
1
)1ln(
1
1 


y
Vi  
Proof 
Journal of Economics and Political Economy 
 JEPE, 3(1), G.E. Halkos, & G.J. Papageorgiou, p.12-31. 
30 
30 
We check whether the equilibrium strategies given by proposition 2 are verified 
by the above value function. The Hamilton–Jacobi–Bellman (HJB) of the 
differential game (31)-(32) becomes:  
 









 )()()(1[)(ln)(max tataty
y
V
tatyV ji
i
ii
 2,12,1,  jiji  
and the maximization of the RHS of the HJB equation yields: 
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y
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




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
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
 
 
Differentiation of the proposition’s 4 value function with respect to the state 
variable y , yields 




1
1
y
Vi  . Now equating the derivatives  
y
Vi


, the final 
result is 1 ia  
 
4. Main Points 
In this paper we first discus the dynamical methods as they applied in 
environmental and resource economics, given in a rigorous mathematical language; 
and second, as a contribution, we introduce and solve two environmental and 
resource models. The first model is an optimal control one, touching the classical 
monopolistic extraction of a depletable resource, disposed after the extraction in a 
market. One of the first model’s crucial characteristic is that the extraction cost is 
dependent not only from the monopolist’s utility but also from the remaining stock 
of the resource. At the solution process, under the closed loop informational 
structure, we found the analytic expression of the optimal monopolistic strategy, 
which also is time consistent and therefore an objective for further research and 
policy instrument, as well.  
In the game theory part of the paper we tackle with a renewable resource model 
for which as the growth function of the resource is set the well known (from 
biology) Gompertz growth function. In the equilibrium analysis that follows, 
pointing out the closed loop solutions of the game, we found the analytic 
expressions of the cooperative and non cooperative strategies. All the above 
strategies are independent the state’s variable as well as the control’s variable, but 
only hinges upon the discount factor. Therefore, these strategies have the important 
properties of time consistency, thus they constitute economically acceptant 
policies. Regarding the players’ payoffs, we also found the analytic expressions of 
the value functions which are functions of the state variable and functions of  the 
common discount rate as well. 
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